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Introduction:  NASA robotic sample return mis-
sions designated Category V Restricted Earth Return by 
the NASA Planetary Protection Office require sample 
containment and biohazard testing in a receiving labor-
atory as directed by NASA Procedural Requirement 
(NPR) 8020.12D [1] – ensuring the preservation and 
protection of Earth and the sample.  Currently, NPR 
8020.12D classifies Restricted Earth Return for robotic 
sample return missions from Mars, Europa, and Encel-
adus with the caveat that future proposed mission loca-
tions could be added or restrictions lifted on a case by 
case basis as scientific knowledge and understanding of 
biohazards progresses.   
Since the 1960s, sample containment from an un-
known extraterrestrial biohazard have been related to 
the highest containment standards and protocols known 
to modern science.  Today, Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 
standards and protocols are used to study the most dan-
gerous high-risk diseases and unknown biological 
agents on Earth.  Over 30 BSL-4 facilities have been 
constructed worldwide with 12 residing in the United 
States; of theses, 8 are operational [2, 3].  In the last two 
decades, these brick and mortar facilities have cost in 
the hundreds of millions of dollars dependent on the fa-
cility requirements and size.  Previous mission concept 
studies for constructing a NASA sample receiving facil-
ity with an integrated BSL-4 quarantine and biohazard 
testing facility have also been estimated in the hundreds 
of millions of dollars.   
As an alternative option, we have recently conducted 
an initial trade study for constructing a mobile and/or 
modular sample containment laboratory that would 
meet all BSL-4 and planetary protection standards and 
protocols at a faction of the cost.  Mobile and modular 
BSL-2 and 3 facilities have been successfully con-
structed and deployed world-wide for government test-
ing of pathogens and pharmaceutical production.  Our 
study showed that a modular BSL-4 construction could 
result in ~ 90% cost reduction when compared to tradi-
tional construction methods without compromising the 
preservation of the sample or Earth.   
COSPAR/NASA Facility Requirements: Under 
the UN Space Treaty of 1967, the Committee on Space 
Research (COSPAR) maintains a planetary protection 
policy at the international level for all space faring na-
tions.  The policy provides “international standard on 
procedures to avoid organic-constituent and biological 
contamination in space exploration” [4]. The policy also 
promotes the prevention of “adverse changes in the en-
vironment of the Earth resulting from the introduction 
of extraterrestrial matter” as stated in the UN Space 
Treaty.  NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 8020.7G [5] 
complies with the UN Space Treaty and COSPAR plan-
etary protection policy stating “the Earth must be pro-
tected from the potential hazard posed by extraterrestrial 
matter carried by a spacecraft returning from another 
planet or other extraterrestrial sources.” 
NASA NPR 8020.12D [1] outlines requirements for 
meeting the NPD 8020.7G [5] as well as specifies plan-
ning documents and reviews for Category V Restricted 
Earth Returns. However, international space treaties, 
COSPAR policies, and NASA planetary protection pol-
icy directives and requirements do not impose specific 
construction design requirements on a BSL-4 facility 
nor biocontainment architecture.   
BSL-4 Facility Standards: In the U.S., the Bi-
osafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laborato-
ries [6] publication authored by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS): Public Health Ser-
vice, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and 
the National Institutes of Health houses the primary rec-
ommendations, standards, and design requirements for 
all BSL labs.  There are two models for modern BSL-4 
laboratories: 
• Cabinet Laboratory: Manipulation of agents must be 
performed in a Class III Biosafety Cabinet (BSC); 
i.e., negative pressure glovebox. 
• Suit Laboratory: Personnel must wear a positive pres-
surized protective suit inside a negative pressure la-
boratory. 
Negative pressure gastight BSL-4 BSC III cabinets and 
suit laboratories have special engineering and design 
features to prevent microorganisms from being dissem-
inated into the environment.  BSL-4 laboratory person-
nel are highly trained with rigorous procedural handling 
of extremely hazardous infectious agents, understand 
the primary and secondary containment functions, and 
know the design characteristics of containment labora-
tory equipment.  For the design/construction require-
ments of a mobile/modular BSL-4 containment, we 
used the established HHS document standards and pro-
tocols for a cabinet laboratory that are currently fol-
lowed in operational BSL-4 facilities in the U.S.   
Mobile BSL-4 Containment Facility: A mobile 
containment facility could secure a sample return cap-
sule (SRC) at the landing site. After biocide decontam-
ination procedures, the facility could be transported an-
ywhere in the world by land, sea, or air.  The mobile 
facility could attach to an existing BSL-4 laboratory that 
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could be used to conduct biohazard analyses on a sam-
ple subset while the mobile lab could provide primary 
clean containment of the science samples awaiting bi-
osafety results.  A second usage scenario could attach 
the lab to a dedicated NASA receiving facility that could 
conduct the primary containment and biohazard testing. 
Additionally, a third scenario could have the mobile fa-
cility remain at the landing site as primary containment 
and a small sample is transported to an existing BSL-4 
facility for biohazard testing.  After completion of bio-
hazard testing, decisions could be made to sterilize the 
sample or transport all or portions to a permanent quar-
antine storage facility. 
The transportable laboratory preliminary design for 
these scenarios was sized at 48 ft x 14 ft, 9.5 ft high, met 
BSL-4 requirements for pressurization, and was de-
signed with appropriate number of containment system 
redundancies and emergency back-ups.  The mobile 
container could be transportable on a flatbed trailer and 
fit into a Boeing C-17 Globemaster III or Lockheed C-
5 Galaxy for air transport. The facility could be self-
contained with the exception of the effluent decontami-
nation system and electrical power supply during 
transport (dual diesel electrical generators positioned on 
the trailer).  
The facility could contain separate rooms for con-
trol/administration, outer change, entry anteroom, 
shower room, inner change room, mechanical, and main 
BSL-4 lab.  The laboratory would be a negative pressure 
ISO class 5 cleanroom with ultra-low penetration air 
(ULPA) and high efficiency gas adsorber (HEGA) fil-
ters. The BSL-4 lab would be outfitted with a negative 
pressure nitrogen enriched Class III BSC glovebox 
chain.  This could include (in-order): 
• SRC antechamber/decontamination 
• SRC hardware de-integration chamber 
• Antechamber/decontamination 
• Primary sample quarantine/opening science canis-
ter chamber 
• Double door autoclave/gas sterilization chamber 
for retrieval of biohazard testing sub-sample    
Material selection for lab finishes and Class III BSC 
would be based on organic and inorganic compounds of 
scientific concern.  All welded stainless steel HVAC 
system exhaust and supply housings could include 
HEPA, ULPA and Teflon (PTFE) filters with automatic 
scanning for leak integrity and He leak tested.  HEGA 
gas/vapor adsorbers and/or absorbers could be used if 
chemicals need to be removed. Gas sterilization/decon-
tamination system (e.g., vapor H2O2 system) could be 
plumbed into each room of the facility.  The facility 
would also be manufactured in a dedicated cleanroom 
to maintain control of the engineering, fabrication, as-
sembly, integration, testing and commissioning before 
deployment. 
Modular BSL-4 Sample Receiving Facility: A 
modular BSL-4 sample receiving facility could be as-
sembled into any shell building or high bay using the 
same construction methods as the mobile laboratory.  
The modular construction could use standard 40 ft con-
tainers, assembled together to create a large lab space 
with BSC III cabinet chains.  Testing and certification 
of the BSL-4 laboratory could be conducted at the man-
ufacturing cleanroom facility and then transported and 
assembled on-site.  Several modular Animal BSL-3 fa-
cilities have been successfully constructed world-wide.  
With added system redundancies, these facilities could 
be reclassified as BSL-4 laboratories. 
Gas-tight Standards:  Class III BSC glovebox gas-
tight (leak rate) criterion is < 1×10-5 cc/s with 100% He 
tracer gas under 3 inH2O pressure in the cabinet. [7] De-
pendent on mission science requirements, specialized 
double walled glovebox seals could be required for 
maintaining nitrogen or other gas environment purity 
under negative pressure.  Non-glove storage isolators 
can achieve a He leak rate of < 1×10-7 cc/s.  However, 
achieving a better leak rate on gloveboxes may require 
additional engineering development and challenges.  
Summary:  Mobile and modular BSL-2 and 3 facil-
ities have been constructed and deployed world-wide 
with great success.  A mobile/modular BSL-4 receiving 
facility can meet all current standards and protocols, in-
cluding redundant systems and critical biological con-
tainment/pressurization requirements.  Manufacturing 
in a dedicated cleanroom can maintain better control of 
the engineering, fabrication, assembly, integration, test-
ing and commissioning of a facility.  Future studies of 
sample receiving facilities that require BSL-4 contain-
ment may wish to include a comparison review of mod-
ern mobile/modular labs as an alternative construction 
option.    
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